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This paper considers the identiﬁcation and estimation of hedonic models. We establish
that technology and preferences in a separable version of the hedonic model are generically
identiﬁed up to a±ne transformations from data on demand and supply in a single hedo-
nic market. For a very general parametric structure, preferences and technology are fully
identiﬁed from demand data. Much of the confusion in the empirical literature that claims
that hedonic models estimated on data from a single market are fundamentally underiden-
tiﬁed is based on linearizations that do not use all of the information in the model. The
exact economic model that justiﬁes the linear approximations has strange properties so
the approximation is doubly poor. A semiparametric estimation method is proposed, and
alternative estimators are considered. Instrumental variables estimators can be applied to




Sherwin Rosen pioneered the analysis of hedonic markets in a perfectly competitive set-
ting. He also proposed an econometric identiﬁcation strategy for recovering preferences
and technology from hedonic markets. His hedonic model characterizes markets for het-
erogeneous goods (or factors or amenities) that implicitly price out the attributes that
characterize the goods (or factors or amenities).
Rosen’s fundamental paper has shaped the way economists think about the pricing of
heterogeneous characteristics. Yet for two reasons, the full potential of his method remains
to be exploited. First, except for special cases, high dimensional hedonic models with mul-
tiple characteristics require solutions of complicated partial di®erential equations to fully
characterize the market equilibrium. This renders di±cult theoretical analyses which re-
quire computation of nonlinear implicit equations. Second, the method of identiﬁcation of
preferences and technology proposed by Rosen has been severely criticized in the literature.
It is widely held that the preferences and technology generating hedonic models are iden-
tiﬁed only through arbitrary functional form and exclusion assumptions, especially when
they are estimated from data on a single market.
This paper considers whether equilibrium in hedonic markets imposes any restrictions
on estimating equations and whether it is possible to identify technology and preferences
from data on a single hedonic market. We consider both parametric and nonparametric
versions of these questions.
We show that the hedonic model has empirical content. For very general parametric
families, the hypothesis of equilibrium imposes very tight restrictions on the data. Prefer-
1ernces and technology are generically identiﬁed from data on a single hedonic market. For
the nonparametric case, we establish generic identiﬁcation of technology and preference
parameters up to a±ne transformations, the standard level of identiﬁcation that can be
obtained from market choice equations.
We establish that commonly used linearization strategies made to simplify estimation
problems produce identiﬁcation problems. The hedonic model is generically nonlinear. The
functional form assumptions made in the applied literature give rise to the identiﬁcation
problems that are widely thought to be fatal to Rosen’s empirical methodology. We go
on to show that the economic model for which the widely used linearization methods are
exact is implausible, so the approximation is doubly poor.
Our identiﬁcation analysis also applies to a broader class of empirical models of non-
linear pricing: models of the e®ects of taxes on behavior when taxes are set optimally
(Mirrlees, 1971), and a model of monopoly pricing (Mussa and Rosen, 1978, Wilson, 1993).
It also applies to the standard problem of taxes and labor supply (Heckman 1974; Haus-
man, 1980). For speciﬁcity, in this paper we focus on the hedonic model, brieﬂyd i s c u s s i n g
other applications in the conclusion.
This paper proceeds in the following way. In section two, we present the hedonic model
and review an important linear-quadratic special case due to Tinbergen (1956), and used
by Epple (1987), that gives rise to closed form solutions. This model justiﬁes widely used
linearizations as exact solutions. In section three, we discuss the peculiar properties of
this model. The inﬂuential criticism of Rosen’s estimating strategy by James Brown and
Harvey Rosen (1982) is based on an linear-quadratic approximation to the true model
which is exact in the Tinbergen model. When the Tinbergen model is slightly perturbed,
the Brown-Rosen critique no longer applies. In section four, we prove a theorem (Thm 1)
2that establishes that for a general class of models, the Brown-Rosen critique only applies
to a special, nongeneric, case. In section three, we go on to discuss standard criticisms of
instrumental variables methods applied to estimate preferences and technology in hedonic
markets: (a) sorting implies that within a single market, there are no natural exclusion
restrictions (Epple, 1987; Kahn and Lang, 1988) and (b) use of multimarket data identiﬁes
the hedonic model by making implicit, and implausible, assumptions about why hedonic
pricing functions di®er across markets.
In section four, we establish (a) the identiﬁability of the hedonic model within a sin-
gle market for a broad class of parametric models (polynomials of any ﬁnite order or any
model belonging to a ﬁnite dimensional vector space); (b) the identiﬁcation of the hedonic
model up to levels for a broad class of nonparametric models; and (c) that using all of the
information from both sides of the hedonic market jointly adds nothing to what can be
identiﬁed analyzing the supply side and demand side separately in conjunction with the
hedonic pricing function. We show how extra information on levels of outcomes, rather
than just pricing and demand equations, aids in identifying the missing level set informa-
tion in the nonparametric case. In section ﬁve, we brieﬂy discuss instrumental variable
estimation strategies. We prove a corollary of Theorem 1 that justiﬁes the application of
IV in the general parametric case and discuss extensions of the existing literature to cover
the nonparametric case. Section six presents some conclusions and suggestions for future
research.
32 The Hedonic Model: General Results and An Im-
portant Special Case With A Closed Form Solution
We ﬁrst present a general statement of the hedonic model. For simplicity, consider a
labor market setting. The model is static. Consumers (workers) match to single worker
ﬁrms. Let z be an attribute vector characterizing jobs. P(z) is the earnings of workers
supplying attribute vector z, which is a disamenity. Let R be unearned income. We deﬁne
U(c,z,µ,A) as the preferences of workers where µ represents preference parameters that
vary across persons, A represents preference parameters common across persons and c is
consumption where c = P(z)+R.G i v e n P(z), a twice continously di®erentiable price
function, and assuming the utility function is twice di®erentiable2, we obtain the following
conditions for a maximum
FOC:
Uc (c,z,µ,A)Pz (z)+Uz (c,z,µ,A)=0 ( 1 )
SOC :
µ
Uzz0 + UcPzz0 + PzUcc0 (Pz)
0
¶
is negative deﬁnite. (2)
2For expositional convenience, we restrict our analysis to economies in which the equilibrium price func-
tion is smooth. Similar analyses can be done for economies in which the equilibrium price function is not
smooth. For an example of an economy with smooth technologies and absolutely continuous distributions
of consumer heterogeneity in which the equilibrium price function is piecewise twice continuously di®eren-
tiable see Nesheim (2001). For other examples of sorting problems with non-smooth pricing functions see
(Wilson, 1993).
4Firms demand attribute z and maximize proﬁts which are a function of output F(z;º,B)
minus production costs P (z)w h e r eº is a vector of technology parameters ﬁrms that vary
across ﬁrms and B is a common technology parameter shared by all ﬁrms. We assume that
the production function is twice di®erentiable. Proﬁts are
¦(z,º,B,P (z)) = F(z;º,B) ¡ P(z)
FOC: Fz (z,º,B) ¡ Pz (z)=0 ( 3 )
SOC:(Fzz0 ¡ Pzz0) is negative deﬁnite. (4)
Throughout we assume the regular case where the second order conditions hold as strict
inequalities.
Workers di®er in their preference vector µ. Firms di®er in their productivity vector
º.L e t t h e d e n s i t y o f µ be fµ. The density of º is fº. W ea s s u m et h a tb o t hº and µ are
absolutely continuous random variables. Analytically, it is useful to distinguish the case
dim(µ) ¸ dim(z)a n dd i m ( º) ¸ dim(z), where “dim” is dimension, from other possible
cases. This is the case analyzed in Rosen (1974). There is no loss of generality for the
purposes of this paper in setting the inequalities to strict equalities.
Assuming a local implicit function theorem applies, we can invert FOC (1) and (3) to
obtain µ and º and hence obtain the classical hedonic case analyzed by Rosen (1974). From
the FOC for the ﬁrm we obtain
º = º (z,Pz,B).
5From the FOC (2) for the consumer we obtain:
µ = µ(z,Pz,P(z)+R,A).
Using these relationships, we substitute into fº and fµ to ﬁnd the density of z demanded
given P(z) and the technology and density of heterogeneity º and the density of z sup-
plied given P(z) and the density of worker heterogeneity, µ and the preference system of
consumers.







This tells us the density of demand for a given price function, technology parameter and
density of º.







This is the density of the amenity supplied as a function of the price function, preference
parameters A and density of µ. From the second order conditions (4) and (2), respectively,
the Jacobian terms are both positive.
Equilibrium in hedonic markets requires that demand and supply be equated at each
p o i n to ft h es u p p o r to fz to solve for the market clearing surface P(z). Equilibrium prices













6The solution depends on the technology of the ﬁrms F, the utility function U of the
workers, and the distributions fº and fµ respectively of ﬁrms and workers in the population.
We examine the empirical content of these restrictions in this paper. Economic theory im-
plies that marginal products and marginal utilities are nonnegative in most cases. In order
for agents to participate in the market, ﬁrms and workers must receive wages and proﬁts
above reservation levels. These criteria generate the boundary conditions that determine
the solution of the di®erential equation for equilibrium prices. They also play a role in the
identiﬁcation analysis.
We next present a linear-quadratic model with normal heterogeneity due to Tinbergen
(1956) that has a closed form expression. This is the model that justiﬁes widely used
empirical approximations as exact descriptions, and provides an intuitive introduction to
the hedonic model.
2.1 A Linear-Quadratic Example







The conditions determining a consumer maximum are
FOC: µ ¡ Az + Pz =0
SOC: (Pzz0 ¡ A)i sn e g a t i v ed e ﬁnite.
On the ﬁrm side, assume the production function is quadratic in z and dim(z)=d i m( º).
3The model in this example was ﬁrst analyzed by Tinbergen (1956) and has been used by Epple (1987)
and Tauchen and Witte (2001) among others.
7Proﬁts are





0Bz ¡ P (z)
and the conditions determining a ﬁrm’s optimum are
FOC: º ¡ Bz ¡ Pz =0
where
SOC: ¡(B + Pzz0)i sn e g a t i v ed e ﬁnite.
The distributions of º,µ in the population are normal. The distribution of µ is µ s
N(µµ;§ µ), and the distribution of º is º s N(µº;§ º).
An arbitrary price function induces a density of demand and a density of supply at
every location z. The equilibrium price function can be found by equating these densities
at every point z and solving the di®erential equation (5). However, in the normal-linear-









and then check that this guess is accurate. Assuming the price function is quadratic, the
ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrm are:
Firm: º ¡ Bz ¡ ¼1 ¡ ¼2z =0 ( 7 )
and for the consumer they are:
Consumer: µ ¡ Az + ¼1 + ¼2z =0 . (8)
8From the second order conditions, B + ¼2 and A ¡ ¼2 are positive deﬁnite. Thus
we may solve for z from (7) to obtain z =( B + ¼2)¡1(º ¡ ¼1)a n df r o m( 8 )z =( A ¡
¼2)¡1(µ + ¼1). Note that once we have solved for ¼1 and ¼2, these latter two equations
deﬁne the equilibrium matching function linking the characteristics of demanders (7) to
those of suppliers (8). For each z, this function is
(B + ¼2)
¡1(º ¡ ¼1)=( A ¡ ¼2)
¡1(µ + ¼1).
Thus, the equilibrium relationship between º and µ is
º = ¼1 +( B + ¼2)(A ¡ ¼2)
¡1(µ + ¼1). (9)
Equilibrium is characterized by a vector ¼1, and a matrix ¼2, that equate demand and
supply at all z subject to all constraints.
In the normal-linear-quadratic case, we may solve for ¼1 and ¼2 that equate demand
and supply, both of which are normally distributed. Equating normal random variables
only requires equating the mean of demand with the mean of supply and the variance of
demand with the variance of supply. The mean demand is obtained from (7):
(B + ¼2)¡1E(º ¡ ¼1)=ED(z) (Average Demand).
The mean supply is obtained from (8):
(A ¡ ¼2)¡1E(µ + ¼1)=ES(z) (Average Supply).
Letting µµ = E(µ)a n dµº = E(º),E D(z)=ES(z) implies that
9(B + ¼2)¡1(µº ¡ ¼1)=( A ¡ ¼2)¡1(µµ + ¼1) (Equality of means).
Rearranging terms, we obtain an explicit expression for ¼1 in terms of A,B,µº,µµ and ¼2 :
[(A ¡ ¼2)¡1 +( B + ¼2)¡1]¡1[(B + ¼2)¡1µº ¡ (A ¡ ¼2)¡1µµ]=¼1.
To determine ¼2, compute the variances of demand and supply from (7) and (8) respec-
tively to obtain:
P
º =( B + ¼2)
PD
z (B + ¼2)0
P





z is the variance of demand given the price schedule and
PS
z is the variance
of z given the supply schedule. From equality of variances of the demand and supply








We pin down initial conditions using the restrictions that U ¸ ¯ U, a reservation value,




¼2)z¡¼0. Hence nonnegativity of proﬁts implies ¡¼0 ¸ 0s i n c e( B+¼2) is positive deﬁnite
by the second order conditions. A similar argument on the worker side implies ¼0 ¸ 0.
Hence ¼0 =0 .




º diagonal, ¼2 is diagonal. E®ectively, this is a













µº(A ¡ ¼2) ¡ µµ(B + ¼2)












Recall that from the second order conditions A ¡ ¼2 > 0a n dB + ¼2 > 0. Equality of
variances implies that (A¡¼2)2¾ºº =( B+¼2)2¾µµ.D e ﬁne ¾º =( ¾ºº)1/2 and ¾µ =( ¾µµ)1/2
so





If ¾º = ¾µ and A = B, ¼2 = 0 is a solution. This is a knife-edge result. If








º = 0, then there is e®ectively only one type of consumer
or one type of ﬁrm respectively. If
P
µ =0 ,¼2 = A and ¼1 = µ, a vector of constants.
If
P
º =0 ,¼2 = B and ¼1 = º, a vector of constants. In those cases, the hedonic price
line coincides with the marginal valuations of consumers or marginal productivity of ﬁrms
respectively.
4The other root violates second order conditions.
113 Identifying and Estimating The Model
Sherwin Rosen stressed the importance of taking theory to data. He considered the
problem of recovering technology and preference parameters from data. He also framed the
empirical questions about hedonic models that have occupied the attention of economists
for the past 27 years.
He analyzed the problem of using data from a single market in which P(z) is available
and there are no missing attributes. Using the ﬁrst order conditions (1) and (3) ((7) and (8)
in the linear-quadratic-normal example) he proposed a two step method for estimating both
preference and technology parameters. He did not consider direct estimation of production,
proﬁt or preference functions, a source of information we consider in section four. We simply
note here that if there are no missing attributes, we can recover the production function
directly from data on inputs and outputs using standard methods. Even if production (or
proﬁt) data are available, data on utility are not, so the problem considered by Rosen still
remains for recovering the parameters of at least one side of the market.
From our discussion of the linear - quadratic - normal case, the parameters ¼1 and ¼2





º = 0 respectively. The pricing function combines parameters in an economically
uninterpretable fashion.
The most direct approach to estimating the hedonic model would be to solve equation
(5) for P(z) in terms of the parameters of preferences, technology and the distributions of
tastes and productivity and to jointly estimate the demand functions and supply functions
and distributions of preference and technology parameters exploiting all of the information
in the equilibrium conditions including data on demand, supply and the pricing function.
12That approach is computationally complicated and does not transparently deliver identiﬁ-
cation of the deep structural parameters.
Rosen suggested an intuitively plausible and computationally simpler two step estima-
tion procedure that has been widely criticized. In step 1 of his procedure, the analyst
estimates P(z) from market data. In step 2, the analyst uses ﬁrst order conditions (1) and
(3) in conjunction with the marginal prices obtained from step 1 to recover preferences and
technology respectively.
In the context of the linear-quadratic example, the ﬁrst stage would be to estimate
pricing function P(z), recover ¼1 and ¼2, and form the marginal prices and then estimate
the curvature parameters of technology, and preferences using (7) and (8) respectively.
Speciﬁcally, he proposed to estimate B and the mean of º (µº)f r o mt h el e a s ts q u a r e s
regression
ˆ ¼1 +ˆ ¼2z = µº + Bz + "º (10)
where "º = º ¡µº, and “ˆ” denotes estimate. A parallel proposal for preferences estimates
A and the mean of µ(µµ) from the regression
ˆ ¼1 +ˆ ¼2z = µµ + Az + "µ (11)
where "µ = µ ¡ µµ. W ea s s u m et h a tµµ and µº are functions of regressors (x)a n d( y)
respectively, µµ(x)a n dµº(y).
In two inﬂuential papers, James Brown and Harvey Rosen (1982) and James Brown
(1983) analyze the regression method based on (10) and (11). These papers contain most
of the main ideas in the empirical literature on hedonics that emerged from Rosen’s pa-
per. They interpret (10) and (11) as linearized approximations to (1) and (3). The linear
quadratic model of Section 2 is the framework for which these approximations are exact.
13In this approximation interpretation, the distributions of º and µ are kept in the back-
ground. Standard linear econometric methods are applied to identify the parameters of
(10) and (11) and connections among the parameters of preferences, technology and the
distributions of tastes and productivity are not made explicit. Issues of identiﬁcation are
confused with issues of estimation. Common to an entire genre of empirical economics, this
literature focuses on ﬁnding “good instruments” and misses basic sources of identiﬁcation
in hedonic models.
Starting from (10) and (11), Brown (1983) and Brown and Rosen (1982) make three
points which have been reiterated in the subsequent empirical literature.
Point One: Identiﬁcation Can Only Be Obtained Through Arbitrary Func-
tional Form Assumptions
Since z is on both sides of (10) and (11), by a property of least squares, a regression
using the constructed price ˆ Pz(z)=ˆ ¼1+ˆ ¼2z as the dependent variable in (10) or (11) only
identiﬁes ¼2 even if µº or µµ are functions of regressors. In general, ¼2 does not identify
any technology or preference parameter. In the special cases where there is no variation in
preference parameters µ or where there is no dispersion in º, ¼2 identiﬁes preference (A)
or production (B) parameters respectively.
However, if the constructed price is a nonlinear function of z, this argument no longer
holds. The nonlinear variation in b Pz (z) gives an added piece of information which can help
to identify technology and preference parameters.5 This identiﬁcation strategy rules out
collinearity between z and b Pz (z), but such nonlinearity is widely viewed as an artiﬁcial
source of identiﬁcation that is thought to be “arbitrary.” In Theorem 1 in section 4, we
prove that this nonlinearity is generic in the hedonic model.
5See Fisher (1966) for an early discussion of the value of nonlinearities in identifying econometric models.
14Point Two: Absence of Instruments
Even if such “arbitrary” assumptions are made, so that we can use the nonlinearity in
b Pz (z) to help identify the parameters and circumvent Point One, we still face standard en-
dogeneity problems. z is correlated with "º and "µ in (10) and (11) respectively. Moreover,
exclusion restrictions from the other side of the market cannot be justiﬁed. In the notation
of this section, the equilibrium matching condition (9) of section 2 requires that
"º = "µ +( A ¡ B)z + µµ(x) ¡ µº(y) (12)
so that conditional on z there is both functional and statistical dependence connecting "µ,
"º,zand the regressors.6 Conditional on z, "º," µ, x and y become stochastically dependent
even if in the underlying population initially they are mutually independent.
With data from a single market, one is forced to hunt for “clever” instruments with a
questionable economic basis. Thus, even if “arbitrary” nonlinearities are invoked, standard
instruments may be lacking. In sections 4 and 5 we show that the economics of the model
guarantees valid instruments even though there are no exclusion restrictions.
Point Three: Use of Multimarket Data
Brown (1983), Brown and Rosen (1982), Kahn and Lang (1988), and Tauchen and Witte
(2001) change Rosen’s problem and consider estimation of the ﬁrst order conditions using
multimarket data either across regions, or across time in the same region. The motivation
for this approach is that if preferences, technology, and the distributions of tastes and
productivities are the same across markets but for some unspeciﬁed reason price functions
are not, variation in the Pz (z) across markets serves to identify preferences and technology.
This source of identiﬁcation is viewed as being more robust.
6Epple (1987), Bartik (1987) and Kahn and Lang (1988) stress this point.
15The problem with this identiﬁcation strategy is that it is logically inconsistent. If
preferences, technology, and the distributions of tastes and productivities are the same
across markets, equilibrium price functions must be as well. The strategy is apparently more
robust because it is vague about the source of variation that makes price functions di®er
when preferences, technology, and the distributions of tastes and technology are common
across markets. This approach can be used to identify the preferences or technology on
one side of the market. If preferences are stable and the distributions of preferences across
markets are stable, but technologies are di®erent for exogenous reasons, then multimarket
variation shifts the hedonic function against stable preferences and identiﬁes preference
parameters. Switching the roles of technology and preferences, multimarket data identiﬁes
technology and the distribution of technology parameters.
3.1 Using All Of The Economics of The Model
These criticisms are symptoms of a deeper problem: all of the economic content of
the hedonic model is not being exploited. We argue that when it is exploited, the model
is generically identiﬁed even within a single market without having to invoke arbitrary
functional forms. We develop this point formally in the next section. Here we develop the
intuition for it using the linear-quadratic model.
Consider all of the economic implications of the linear-quadratic model - not just the
ﬁrst order conditions (7) and (8). Any reasonable speciﬁcation of the model requires that
proﬁts be non-negative, that utilities exceed threshold reservation values and that ﬁrm
marginal products be non-negative while marginal utilities of consumers for disamenities
be non-positive. Adopting all of these restrictions eliminates Point One within the linear-
16quadratic example of Section 2.
The linear-quadratic-normal model of Section 2 results in an equilibrium with a linear
marginal price function. This equilibrium produces an econometric system that is not
identiﬁed. (Brown-Rosen Point One). In this example, it would be arbitrary and incorrect
to impose that the marginal price function is nonlinear. However, the model in Section
2 is very special. It belongs to a very small class of models that produce an equilibrium
marginal price function that is linear. In the next section we prove as a special case of a
more general theorem that there is an open dense set of models surrounding the linear-
quadratic models of Section 2 that do not produce linear marginal price functions. In these
models, it is not arbitrary to impose nonlinear marginal price functions.
The normal-linear-quadratic example has a number of peculiarities. From (7) and (8),
it is evident that marginal products can become negative, and marginal disutilities of labor
(z) can become positive. Nothing restricts marginal prices to be non-negative or for the
demands or supplies of z to be non-negative.
To see how fragile Point One is, suppose that we perturb the scalar version of the model
to have non-normal µ and º.P r o ﬁts are






with ﬁrst order condition
º1 ¡ bz ¡ P0(z)=0 .
Worker preferences are





with ﬁrst order condition
µ1 ¡ az + P
0(z)=0 .
Figure 1 shows the price functions for two cases. A full speciﬁcation of parameter values
generating ﬁgures 1-4 is given in Table 1. The ﬁrst case is for º1 and µ1 normally dis-
tributed. (¸ = 1; see the notes) The second case is for º1 and µ1 distributed as a mixture of
normals with weights ¸ = .999 (for the original case which produced the straight line) and
1 ¡ ¸ = .001. With this minor perturbation, the price function becomes highly nonlinear.
The second derivative of the price function is far from zero. (Figure 2). Figure 3 and 4
show two other cases when ¸ = .99 and ¸ = .90. A small dose of nonnormality produces a
highly nonlinear price function, and undercuts Brown-Rosen Point One.
These ﬁgures also reveal unattractive properties of the linear-quadratic model. Negative
and positive quantities of z are demanded and supplied and marginal prices are negative
for a large portion of the population. Figures 4 and 5 present a case where marginal prices
are positive because we restrict º1 ¸ 0, b>0, µ1 ¸ 0a n da>0. A full speciﬁcation
of parameter values is given in Table 2. We write `n º1 = º10 + º0
11x + "º and `n µ1 =
µ10 + µ
0
11y + "µ where (x,y,"º and "µ) are mixtures of normals. Now marginal prices
are nonlinear and positive and only positive quantities of the amenity are demanded and
supplied. By imposing economically plausible restrictions, Brown-Rosen Point One is shown
to be less cogent. In Section 4 we show that these examples are generic.
18Even though Point One is non-generic, Point Two remains. There are apparently no
valid instruments for z on the right hand sides of (10) and (11). A strategy needs to be
found to deal with the endogeneity of z. In the next two sections, we discuss two such
strategies and present general results for a model with a single characteristic with no
arbitrary functional form restrictions or distributional assumptions and establish that the
hedonic model is generically identiﬁed from data from a single market. Even though there
are no exclusion restrictions, instrumental variables is a valid estimator.
4 Parametric and Nonparametric Analyses of A One
Dimensional Model with Additively Separable First
Order Conditions
This section analyzes a class of one dimensional models for z with additive separability
in the ﬁrst order conditions but with no speciﬁc functional form or distributional assump-
tions imposed. The one dimensional case allows us to abstract from a variety of problems
that we address in our other work: (a) questions of existence of solutions to partial dif-
ferential equations and (b) questions about the proper treatment of missing attributes in
a multidimensional model.7 Both types of questions are important but they distract us
from the basic questions of identiﬁcation and testability of the hedonic model posed in the
introduction to this paper.
We analyze a class of separable preferences and technologies on the ﬁrm side. We start
7Existence conditions for ordinary di®erential equations are much easier to satisfy. See Zachmanoglou
and Thoe, 1986.
19with production technology F(z,x,"1)w h e r e( x,"1)=º in the notation of Section 2. We
use a more symmetric notation to simplify the exposition. The ﬁrst order condition is
Fz(z,x,"1)=P
0(z).
We consider a class of models with restrictions on Fz(z,x,") such that we can separate z
from x and "1,a n dx from "1. For a known monotonic transformation Ã1, we assume that
Ã1(Fz(z,x,")) = ¿(z)+M1(´1(x)+"1))
where M1 is monotonic in (´1(x)+"1)a n dÃ1 2 C2,M 1 2 C2. With this restriction, we
can write FOC as
¿(z)+M1(´1(x)+"1)=Ã1(P
0(z))
so we can rewrite the model in the following way:
M
¡1
1 [¿(z) ¡ Ã1(P
0(z))] = ´1(x)+"1. (A-1a)
with
Support "1 =( 0 ,1). (A-1b)
Leading cases include




M1 can be the identity function, the exponential function or any other monotonic
transformation of ´1(x)+"1
or








For speciﬁcity, we consider one member of this class noting that we can generalize our








= '1(z), the conditions for proﬁt maximization are
FOC: '1(z)+´1 (x)+"1 = P
0(z) (13)
which is a special case of the transformations (A-1a) introduced above and
SOC: '0
1(z) ¡ P 00(z) < 0.
On the worker side, we analyze preferences with a constant marginal utility of consump-
tion of goods. For speciﬁcity, we consider a particular model:





= '2(z) and write the maximization conditions as
FOC: P0 (z) ¡ '2(z)+´2(y)+"2 =0
and
SOC: P 00 (z) ¡ '0
2(z) < 0.
Again, our analysis applies to a broader class of preferences with separable marginal utili-
ties. We develop this point below.
We assume an equilibrium determination of prices so that equilibrium condition (5)
applies. Let q1(x) be the density of x with support X and let q2 (y) be the density of y with
support Y. Deﬁne the density of "1 as g1("1)a n dt h ed e n s i t yo f"2 as g2("2). Assume x is
independent of "1 and y is independent of "2.T h eﬁrst order conditions deﬁne mappings
from (x,"1)t o( x,z)a n df r o m( y,"2)t o( y,z):
"1 = P




0(z) ¡ '2(z) ¡ ´2(y)
y = y.
These expressions relate equilibrium sortings of "1 and "2 to z given x and y respectively.
Such sorting is an essential feature of the hedonic equilibrium model. The associated
Jacobians are dxd"1 =[ P 00(z)¡'0
1(z)]dxdz and dyd"2 =[ '0
2(z)¡P00(z)]dydz, respectively.

















where X and Y are supports of X and Y respectively. Initial conditions are provided by
the requirements that ¦ ¸ 0a n dU ¸ u0.
We will now state a genericity result. Recall that a property P (µ), depending on a
parameter µ 2 £, is called generic if the set ­ ½ £ of values of the parameter for which
it holds true contains a countable intersection of open dense subsets. If £ is a complete
metric space, such a set ­ will be dense in £, by a celebrated theorem of Baire. Moreover,
the intersection of two such sets will still be dense in £. In other words, if a property
is generic, and does not hold for a certain value ¯ µ of the parameter, there will be in any
neighbourhood of ¯ µ some other value µ of the parameter where the property holds true. A
generic property is robust in the sense that if P1 (µ)a n dP2 (µ) are generic, then so is their
intersection P1 (µ) \ P2 (µ).
The “parameters” of the model which are functions are ('1,' 2),(g1,g 2),(´1,´ 2),(q1,q 2).We
have the following:
Theorem 1 Generically with respect to any of the parameter pairs, the equilibrium equa-
tions have no solution of the form P0 (z)=a1 + b1'1 (z), nor any solution of the form
P0 (z)=a2 + b2'2 (z).
The precise deﬁnitions of the parameter spaces and their respective topologies are given
in Appendix A, together with the proof of the theorem. This theorem can easily be
23modiﬁed to prove that generically, the equilibrium equations have no solution P 0 (z)w h i c h
can be expressed as a polynomial in ('1,' 2).
As a consequence of this theorem, Brown-Rosen Point One that regressions of P 0(z)o n
'1(z)o r'2(z) simply recover the marginal price (ˆ a1 =0 ,ˆ b1 =1 ; ˆ a2 =0 ,ˆ b2 =1 )i sn o t
generically correct. The model is intrinsically nonlinear. The examples presented at the
end of the section 3 are prototypical, not special. There is no arbitrariness in assuming
that P 0(z)a n d'1(z) do not lie in the same linear space.
Even if Point One is not generic, Point Two remains. Within a single market, there is
no natural exclusion restriction. The larger question considered in this paper is whether we
can identify (g1,g 2,' 1,' 2,´1,´2)f r o md a t ao nP(z),z,x,and y from a single market. We
focus on identifying (g1,' 1,´1)f r o md a t ao nP (z),z,and x since the analysis is symmetric
for (g2,' 2,´2) using data on P (z),z,and y. W el a t e rc o n s i d e rw h a ti n f o r m a t i o n ,i fa n y ,i s
available from the joint density of (z,x,y,P(z)).
We present two methods for recovering these functions from data in a single market.
One is based on extensions of average derivative models (Powell, Stock and Stoker, 1989)
and closely related transformation models (see Horowitz (1998)). We develop these methods
in this section. The other is based on nonlinear instrumental variables. (Amemiya, 1975).
The second method is based on a corollary of Theorem 1 which we prove in section ﬁve.
The trick in applying average derivative and transformation models to the hedonic
problem is to exploit the separability of z,x and "1.D e ﬁne
T1(z)=P
0(z) ¡ '1(z).
This function combines price and preference data. This kind of function is called a transfor-
mation function and its nonparametric identiﬁcation and estimation have received extensive
24theoretical attention. (See Horowitz (1998) for a survey and new results). These models
extend average derivative models (Powell, Stock and Stoker, 1989) by considering nonlinear
transformations of dependent variables. Observe that T1(z)=M
¡1
1 (¿(z) ¡ Ã1(P0(z)) as
deﬁn e di n( A - 1 a ) .
Let G1 be the cumulative distribution function corresponding to g1. Assuming X is
independent of "1 and taking account of the ﬁrst order condition (13), we may write
F
1(z |x)=G1(T1(z) ¡ ´1(x))
where F1 (z |x) is the empirical cumulative density function of z conditional on x.A s s u m i n g
that lim
q!1 T1(q)=1, which follows from the assumption that the support of "1 =( 0 ,1),
and further assuming that T1 and ´1 are twice continuously di®erentiable, we may write
F
1






















for all i,j. (17)
25This ratio determines the level sets of ´1(x). More generally, taking the ratio of (15) to (16)















































.S i n c eh(z,x)s a t i s ﬁes equation (19), then h(z,x)m u s t
be of the form
h(z,x)=h0 + h1(z)+h2(x)
where h1(0) = 0,h 2(0) = 0, and h0 is a constant. h0, h1(z)a n dh2(x) are known empirically.









This equation has the solution
T
0
1 (z)=K1 exp(h1 (z)) (20)





where C1 is another constant of integration.
This solution enables us to solve for ´1(x). Substituting (20) into (18),
@´1
@xi
exp(h0 + h1(z)+h2(x)) = K1 exp (h1(z))
@´1(x)
@xi






where R1 is a constant of integration and the multiple integral is taken over all the dimen-
sions of x.
For a given K1,w ec a ni d e n t i f yT1(z)a n d´1(x) up to constants. From (15), we can
identify g1("1) using a normalization on "1 to tie down the undetermined combination of











"1 = T1(z) ¡ ´1(x)=( C1 ¡ R1)+K1(˜ T(z) ¡ ˜ ´1(x))
we can identify the combination of coe±cients (C1¡R1)b ya s s u m i n gE("1)=0o rm e d i a n
("1)=0o rﬁxing some quantile of "1 to a known value. This leaves K1 undeﬁned (and
the speciﬁcv a l u e so fC1 and R1 that equal C1 ¡ R1). From (15) and (16) we can identify
g1("1) up to scale. Speciﬁcally we deﬁne
˜ "1 =( "1/K1)
g1("1)d"1 = K1g1(˜ "1K1)d˜ "1 =˜ g1(˜ "1).
Since we know P0(z),we can identify ˜ '1(z)=P0(z) ¡ K1 ˜ T(z) ¡ C1.






and ˜ g2(˜ "2)=K2g2(K2"2)d"2 where ˜ "2 =( "2/K2), and ˜ '2(z)=P0(z)+K2 ˜ T2(z)+C2 where
the constants are deﬁned in a fashion analogous to the case previously analyzed.
The lack of identiﬁcation of the scale of the utility function is a classical result. We
do not observe utility so we can only identify level sets connected with utility. If we
observe output or utility, we can determine the missing parameters by using direct analysis
of the production or proﬁt functions. Direct estimation of (A-2) entails identiﬁcation
28of a correlated random coe±cient model in a semiparametric setting.8 Using (13) as a
replacement function in the sense of Heckman and Robb (1985) or as a control function





























so we determine '1(z) up to an additive constant and in the context of the example for
linear in parameters ´1(x)w ed e t e r m i n eK1.
With additional (weak) parametric structure, we can determine the scaling constants
without using the output data. Thus, we can stay within the Rosen program which does not
8See Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) for a discussion of correlated random coe±cient models.
29contemplate using output data. We now assume that there is a ﬁnite-dimensional vector
space E which contains both Á1 and Á2 and which is known ex ante. In other words, both
Á1 and Á2 can be described by a ﬁnite set of parameters (a1,...,aK)a n d( b1,...,bK)w h i c h
enter linearly: Á1 =
P
ak¯ Ák where the ¯ Ák are known functions, and similarly for Á2. It
will be assumed that E consists of C1 functions, and contains the constants. For example,
E could be the set of polynomials of degree less than or equal to m where m is a known
integer.
Theorem 2 Generically with respect to any of the parameter pairs in Theorem 1, no so-
lution P of the equilibrium equation belongs to E,a n d'1,' 2 are identiﬁed up to additive
constants
Proof. As shown above, we have:
˜ T1 (z)=

















Arguing as in Theorem 1, we can show that generically P/ 2 E. This being the case, there
must be some continuous function f such that
R
fh =0f o ra l lh 2 E, but
R
fP0 6=0 .
Applying such a function to both sides of the preceding equalities, we get:
Z





0 (z)f (z)dz ,i =1 ,2
which determines Ki,i=1 ,2. Plugging back into the equations, we ﬁnd that 'i is deter-
mined up to an additive constant Ci
304.1 Is There Information In The Joint Densities?




functions from single market data. So far we have only considered identiﬁcation using data
from only one side of the market. We now consider whether additional information can
be extracted from the joint densities on both demand and supply sides.
Thus far we have used information on the joint densities of (x,z)a n d( y,z) and have
shown how to identify everything except K1,K 2. In the parametric case covered by Theorem
2, we identify K1 and K2.
There is one potentially powerful piece of information that we have not yet used; the
joint distribution of (x,y,z). This joint distribution may have identifying power because
the distribution of z conditional on x does not equal the distribution of z conditional on x
and y. Where there is sorting on both sides of the market, this full joint density contains
information that might be exploited.9 We show that there is no more information available
beyond what is in the marginal densities.
Recall the ﬁrst-order conditions from the previous section. On the ﬁrm side we have
"1 = T1 (z) ¡ ´1 (x)
a n do nt h ew o r k e rs i d ew eh a v e
"2 = T2 (z) ¡ ´2(y).
These technologies are the primitives of the model. The other primitive is the joint density
9Epple (1987) discusses the potential importance of using the full joint density but his discussion is not
complete.
31for (x,y,"1," 2):
q1 (x)q2 (y)g1 ("1)g2 ("2).
By assumption x,y,"1," 2 are jointly independent. Note that this independence does not
hold conditional on location z, but only holds across all z locations. (One can think of the
hedonic equilibrium as a mapping from the joint distribution of (x,y,"1," 2)t ot h ej o i n t
distribution of (x,y,"1," 2,z)). This mapping does not change the marginal distribution of
(x,y,"1," 2). This marginal distribution is exogenous and can only change over time due to
exogenous time trends, investments, exit or entry, or fundamental demographic change.10
Given the model primitives, we want to derive what restrictions the model places on the
observable data; i.e. the joint distribution of (x,y,z). To derive these restrictions note the
following. The random vector underlying the economy is (x,y,"1," 2). The dimension of
this random vector is nx+ny +2wherenx is the dimension of x, ny is the dimension of y,
and "1 and "2 are each of dimension 1. The equilibrium maps this underlying random vector
into the observable random vector (x,y,z). This observable random vector is of dimension
nx + ny + 1; it is of dimension one less than fundamental random vector (x,y,"1," 2).
In order to derive the observed data density we ﬁrst ﬁx the functions T 0
1(z1)a n dT 0
2(z2).
Imagine an economy where both ﬁrms and workers are choosing locations taking T0
1 and
T 0
2 as given, but that ﬁrms choose z1 while workers choose z2. For the moment, we do not
impose equilibrium and allow z1 6= z2. The following mapping generates the data from this
10A more complete dynamic analysis would model how this marginal distribution changes over time.
32hypothetical economy:
x = x; y = y
"1 = T1 (z1) ¡ ´1 (x)
"2 = T2 (z2) ¡ ´2(y)
These functions map observable and unobservable characteristics of workers and ﬁrms into





































This mapping deﬁnes a density on (x,y,z1,z 2):





T h i si saw e l ld e ﬁned density for the disequilibrium economy. However, if we impose
equilibrium (z1 = z2 = z), we can determine the joint density of (x,y,z). It is the density
of (x,y,z1,z 2) conditional on z1 = z2 = z. That is, the density of (x,y,z)i s
f(x,y,z)
=












33I nt h ea p p e n d i xw ep r o v et h a tt h e r ei sn om o r ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ej o i n td e n s i t i e st h a ni n
the marginal densities.
Theorem 3 Joint density (22) provides no more information than the marginal densities
f (z1,x),f(z2,y).
Proof: See Appendix A. ¥
4.2 The Role of Separability
The key role in identiﬁcation played by separability assumption (A-1a) is demonstrated
in Figures 7 and 8 which plot marginal willinging to pay and marginal products against z.
The marginal pricing function is also plotted.
Separability of the ﬁrst order conditions as used in this paper (see condition A-1a) gives
parallel willingness to pay and marginal productivity curves. (See the two parallel curves in
each ﬁgure for two values of x and y respectively). Equilibrium is at point A of each curve.
As x shifts we reach a new equilibrium B. But the slope of B i st h es a m ea st h es l o p ea t
B0 on the initial benchmark curve. Thus, with su±cient support for Z (guaranteed by the
assumption (A-1) on the support of "1 and "2) we can trace out the benchmark willingness
to pay (Y = y0) and marginal productivity curves (X = x0) using data on all levels of Z
and X. In a nonseparable case, we cannot relate the slope at B to any particular point
on the benchmark curves. The entire analysis of this section can be reproduced for any
member of the class of transformations deﬁned in (A-1).
345 Instrumental Variables
Theorem 1 supplemented with some additional regularity conditions justiﬁes the appli-
cation of instrumental variables for general parametric versions of model (13). Instrumental
variables are generically valid even though there are no exclusion restrictions.
We analyze the ﬁrst order condition
P
0(z)='1 (z)+´1 (x)+"1
with z 2Z=( 0 ,1),x2X=( 0 ,1), and "1 2 E1 =( 0 ,1)w h e r e( x,") » q1 (x)g1 (")
and q1 and g1 are strictly positive densities, P 0(z) > 0,' 1 (z) > 0a n dP 00 ¡ '0
1 > 0. We
assume EX (´2
1 (x)) < 1.
The literature reviewed in Section 3 establishes that in a single market setting there are
no exclusion restrictions for this equation. Variables from the other side of the market are
stochastically dependent on "1 given Z = z.
Although there are no natural exclusion restrictions, instruments for '1(z)a r es t i l l
available. If EZ('1(Z) | x) is not collinear with ´1(x), then it is possible to use X as
instruments for '1(z) in (13). Kahn and Lang (1988) make this point by way of an ex-
ample for a particular functional form. In this section we establish that generically X is a
valid instrument for any arbitrary parametric functional form that satisﬁed the conditions
required to prove a corollary to Theorem 1. This result highlights the main themes of our
paper: that the hedonic model is intrinsically nonlinear, that nonlinearity is an important
source of identifying information and that intuitions developed in linear econometrics when
applied to a nonlinear model are misleading. We can use our result to justify the choice of
parametric nonlinear IV as in Amemiya, 1975.
35As a consequence of Theorem 1, instrumental variable estimation strategies for general
nonparametric models are valid. In the appendix, we prove that generically the expectation
of '1(z)g i v e nx is not collinear with ´1(x). This means that the X are valid instruments
for '1(z).
Corollary 1 of Theorem 1 Generically with respect to any pair of the parameters in
Theorem 1, EZ ('1 (z)|x) cannot be collinear with ´1.
Proof: See Appendix A. ¥
As a consequence of this corollary, we can use X as an instrument for '1(Z)u s i n g
parametric nonlinear IV (Amemiya, 1975). We conjecture that this condition also justiﬁes
the application of nonparametric IV (Darolles et. al, 2001, Florens, Heckman, Meghir and
Vytlacil, 2000, or Newey and Powell, 2000). However, those papers require an exclusion
restruction which is not intrinsic to the model and it is necessary to extend their arguments
to impose Corollary 1 as an identifying condition in the estimation. This is a task we leave
for the future.
6 Summary, Conclusions and Proposed Extensions
This paper considers identiﬁcation and estimation of technology and preference parame-
ters using data on choices made in a single hedonic market. The general hedonic problem is
formulated, a normal-linear-quadratic version of the model is developed and its advantages
and peculiarities are exposed.
Standard criticisms directed against Sherwin Rosen’s two stage estimation procedure for
hedonic models are shown to be misleading. Generically, a separable nonparametric version
of the model is identiﬁed up to levels. With mild functional form assumptions, the model
36is completely identiﬁed. Two estimation procedures are presented: (a) nonparametric
transformation methods, and (b) IV in a general nonlinear but parametric setting.
The analysis developed here applies to closely related problems of estimating preferences
and technology when taxes are set optimally (Mirrlees, 1971 and 1986), when monopolists
price discriminate (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Wilson, 1993) and for the standard problem of
taxes and labor supply (Heckman, 1974; Hausman 1980) when tax schedules are nonlinear
and continuous.
Our presentation of the hedonic model is for the vector case. Yet our basic proofs are
only for the scalar case. An extension for the nonseparable vector case is underway in joint
work with Rosa Matzkin. That work considers the case of identiﬁcation for a nonseparable
hedonic model with vector attributes when some of the attributes are missing. (Ekeland,
Heckman, Matzkin and Nesheim, 2001, in preparation)
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417 Appendix: Proofs
Recall that we have denoted by X and Y the supports of q1 and q2,s ot h a tw em a ya s s u m e
that x 2Xand y 2Y . Denote by Z the domain of z, so that z 2Z;b o t h'1 and '2
map Z into R. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that Z is an interval, possibly
unbounded. We denote by C1 (Z), the space of continuously di®erentiable11 functions on
Z endowed with the following topology: fn ! f i® fn converges to f and the derivatives
f0
n converge to f0, uniformly on compact subsets of Z. It is known that this topology turns
C1 into a complete metric space.12
Denote by C2
1 (R) the space of twice di®erentiable functions g on the real line, satisfying
R
g =1a n dg>0 everywhere, with g,g0,g 00 continuous and uniformly bounded. It is
endowed with the topology of uniform convergence of g,g0,g00 which turns it into a complete
metric space; this is the natural space for g1 and g2.
The natural spaces for ´1 and ´2 are C1 (X)a n dC1 (Y) respectively. The natural spaces
for q1 and q2 are C0
1 (X)a n dC0
1 (Y), where C0
1 denotes the space of continous functions q
such that
R
q =1a n dq>0 everywhere, endowed with the uniform norm. We now restate
Theorem 1 more precisely:
Theorem 1 Restated Generically with respect to any of the parameters pairs ('1,' 2) 2
C1 (Z)× C1 (Z), (g1,g 2) 2 C2
1 (R)×C2
1 (R), (´1,´2) 2 C1 (X)×C1 (Y),(q1,q 2) 2 C0
1 (X)×
C0
1 (Y) the equilibrium equations have no solution of the form P 0(z)=a1 + b1'1 (z), nor
any solution of the form P0 (z)=a2 + b2'2 (z).
11If z0 2Zis the left (or right) extremity of Z,ad e r i v a t i v ea tz0 will be understood to mean a right (or
left) derivative.
12And even a Banach space if Z is compact.
42Proof of Theorem 1:
Set ('1,' 2,g 1,g 2,´1,´2,q 1,q 2)=µ and C1 (Z) × C1 (Z) × C2
1 (R)× C2
1 (R)× C1 (X) ×
C1 (Y) × C0
1 (X) × C0
1 (Y)=£ .
Deﬁne a map © : £ × R4 ! C0 (R)b y :





g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (z) ¡ ´1 (x))q1 (x)dx
¡(b1'
0





g2 (a1 + b1'1 (z) ¡ '2 (z) ¡ ´2 (y))q2 (y)dy
©(µ,a1,b 1)=0 ,o r©( µ,a1,b 1)(z) = 0 for all z, means that the equilibrium equation
has a solution of the form
P (z)=a1 + b1'1 (z)
and we want to show that, generically in any of the parameter pairs, this cannot happen.
To do that, ﬁxt h r e ep o i n t sz1,z 2,z 3 in Z, all pairwise distinct, and deﬁne a map ª :
£ × R2 ! R3 by:
ª(µ,a1,b 1)=( ©( µ,a1,b 1)(zi))1·i·3
Lemma: The map ª is C1
Proof: The Gateaux derivative Dªo fªa t( µ,a1,b 1) is easily expressed. Set ±µ =
(±'1,±' 2,±g 1,±g 2,±´1,±´2,±q 1,±q 2), where the components of ±µ belong to the appropriate
vector spaces, ±g1,±g 2,±q 1,±q 2 being subject to the additional requirement of integrating
to zero. Similarly, set (±a1,±b 1) 2 R2, and compute the ﬁrst variation of ª:







































±g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))q1 (x)dx ¡
(b1'
0













1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))±´1 (x)q1 (x)dx +
(b1'
0













g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))±q1 (x)dx ¡
(b1'
0





g2 (a1 + b1'1 (zi) ¡ '2 (zi) ¡ ´2 (y))±q2 (y)dy+
Since the functions g1 and g2 are uniformly bounded, and their ﬁrst derivatives also, all
the integrals in these formulas are well-deﬁned. Since the functions g1 and g2 are uniformly
continuous, as are their ﬁrst derivatives, these integrals depend continuously on (a1,b 1)a n d
on µ. So the function ª is C1.
44This ends the proof of the lemma. To prove the theorem, we have to vary each pair of
parameters singly. This amounts to considering, instead of ª, the partial maps obtained
by keeping all parameter values ﬁxed except two, and showing that the corresponding
derivative is onto. This gives four di®erent cases.
Genericity with respect to ('1,' 2) We consider the partial map ª('1,' 2,a 1,b 1)
and the derivative of the partial map Dª(±'1,±' 2,±a 1,±b 1), where it is understood that
all the other parameters g1,g 2,´1,´2,q 1,q 2 are set to ﬁxed values. Hence the derivative of
the partial map is given by (A ¡ 1) with all variations other than (±'1,±' 2,±a 1,±b 1)s e tt o
zero.
Since the point zi are pairwise distinct, we can choose the (±'1,±' 2)s ot h a t( ±'1(zi),±' 2(zi)) =
(0,0) for all i. Choosing in addition (±a1,±b 1)=( 0 ,0) cancels all the terms on the right-
hand side except the two ﬁrst ones. Since the remaining integrals are non-zero (in fact,
positive), the coe±cients of ±'0
1(zi)a n d±'0
2(zi) cannot vanish together. So the image by
Dª of vectors such that (±'1(zi),±' 2(zi)) = (0,0) and (±a1,±b 1)=( 0 ,0) must be all of R3.
Saying that Dª is onto means that the partial map ª is transversal to every point in
R3, in particular to the origin. By Thom’s transversality theorem, generically in ('1,' 2),
the partial map
(a1,b 1) ! ª('1,' 2,a 1,b 1)
is transversal to the origin. This means that whenever ª('1,' 2,a 1,b 1)=0 , the partial
derivative Da1,b1ª must be onto; but the latter is impossible, since Da1,b1ª sends a two-
dimensional space into a three-dimensional one. So ª('1,' 2,a 1,b 1) 6= 0 for every (a1,b 1).
We have thus proved that, generically in ('1,' 2), we must have ©('1,' 2,a 1,b 1)(zi) 6=0
for one i at least. This implies of course that ©('1,' 2,a 1,b 1)(z) cannot be identically
45zero, and hence that the equilibrium equation does not have a solution of the form P (z)=
a1 + b1'1 (z). The same argument will show that, generically in ('1,' 2), the equilibrium
equation does not have a solution of the form P (z)=a2 +b2'2 (z). Since the intersection
of two generic properties is generic, the theorem follows for the pair ('1,' 2).¥
Genericity with respect to (g1,g 2) We consider the partial map ª(g1,g 2,a 1,b 1),
where it is understood that all the other parameters are pegged to ﬁxed values. The partial
derivative is given by






±g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))q1 (x)dx ¡
(b1'
0









































2(a1 + b1'1(zi) ¡ '2(zi) ¡ ´2(y))q2(y)]i=1,2,3
Introduce the distribution functions µ1 and µ2 of the random variables ´1 and ´2.T h e y







±g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi)+t)dµ1 ¡
(b1'
0




±g2 (a1 + b1'1 (zi) ¡ '2 (zi)+t)dµ2]i=1,2,3
Setting ci = a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi)a n ddi = a1 + b1'1 (zi) ¡ '2 (zi), and denoting by µi
1
and µi
2 the translates of µ1 and µ2 by ¡ci and ¡di we rewrite the ﬁrst two lines of the
partial derivative again as:















We pick the zi so that the probability measures µi
1 and µi
2,i =1 ,2,3, are pairwise
di®erent, and '0
1 (zi)a n d'0
2 (zi) do not vanish. Then the coe±cients of the integrals
cannot vanish simultaneously, and the right-hand side clearly spans R3. We conclude as in
the preceding case; by applying Thom’s transversality theorem.
Genericity with respect to (q1,q 2) We consider the partial map ª(g1,g 2,a 1,b 1),
where it is understood that all the other parameters are pegged to ﬁxed values. The partial
derivative is given by:





g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))±q1 (x)dx¡
(b1'0








































2(a1 + b1'1(zi) ¡ '2(zi) ¡ ´2(y))q2(y)]i=1,2,3
We claim that the partial map obtained by setting (±a1,±b 1) = 0 is onto. We get
Dª(±q1,±q 2)=





g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))±q1 (x)dx ¡
(b1'
0





g2 (a1 + b1'1 (zi) ¡ '2 (zi) ¡ ´2 (y))±q2 (y)dy]i=1,2,3
We choose the zi so that the '0
1 (zi)a n dt h e'0
2 (zi) do not vanish, and so that the func-
tions g1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x)) and g2 (a1 + b1'1 (zi) ¡ '2 (zi) ¡ ´2 (y)) are pairwise
di®erent on a set of positive measure. The claim then follows, and genericity obtains as in
the preceding cases.
Genericity with respect to (´1,´2)W e c o n s i d e r







1(a1 +( b1 ¡ 1)'1 (zi) ¡ ´1 (x))±´1 (x)q1 (x)dx +
(b1'
0







2 (a1 + b1'1 (zi) ¡ '2 (zi) ¡ ´2 (y))±´2 (y)q2 (y)dy
48and we argue as in the preceding case.
Proof of Theorem 3:
The strategy of the proof is to determine whether taking the objects determined from
the marginal densities as demonstrated in the previous subsection and plugging them into
(22) provides any more information about the parameters that are not identiﬁed.





















Using the information secured from the marginals, we obtain
T1 (z)=K1 ˜ T1 (z)+C1; T2 (z)=K2 ˜ T2 (z)+C2
˜ g1 (˜ "1)=g1 (K1˜ "1)K1;˜ g2 (˜ "2)=g2 (K2˜ "2)K2
´1 (x)=K1˜ ´1 (x)+R1; ´2 (x)=K2˜ ´2 (x)+R2
where










and “s ” denotes that this information is known from the marginals.









1 (s)K1g1 (K1˜ "1 (s,x)) ˜ T
0
2(s)K2g2 (K2˜ "2 (s,y))ds.
where ˜ "1(s,x)a n d˜ "2(s,y) are written as explicit functions of (s,x)a n d( s,y) respectively
where s is an argument of integration. From the analysis of the marginals, we do not know
g1,g 2 but rather ˜ g1,˜ g2 which are functions of ˜ "1 and ˜ "2 respectively. Thus the unidentiﬁed








1 (s)ˆ g1 (ˆ "1 (s,x)) ˜ T
0
2 (s)˜ g2 (˜ "2 (s,y))ds.
Proof of Corollary 1 of Theorem 1:
By deﬁnition,
P
0 (z) ¡ '1 (z)=´1 (x)+"1.
Because of the second-order condition P 00 (z) ¡ '0
1 (z) > 0 so that the left side can be
inverted uniquely (globally) to obtain
z =¤( ´1 (x)+"1)
where by the implicit function theorem ¤0(q)=[ P 00 (¤(q)) ¡ '0
1 (¤(q))]
¡1 . Deﬁne the
mapping
h = '1 (¤(´1 (x)+"1))
x = x,
50where
Ez ('1 (z)|x)=Ez (h|x)=
Z
E
'1 (¤(´1 (x)+"1))g1 ("1)d"1.
This conditional expectation is a functional of ´1.Assume it is linear with respect to ´1.




['1 (¤(´1 (x)+t± ´ 1 (x)+"1)) ¡ '1 (¤(´1 (x)+"1))]g1 ("1)d"1









1 (P 00 ¡ '0
1) ¡ '0
1 (P000 ¡ '00
1))(P 00 ¡ '0
1)
¡3¤
± ¤. This reduces to:
Z
¸(´1 (x)+"1)g1 ("1)d"1 =0 a . e .x
and the function ¸ has the property that every translate of ¸ by any amount ´1 (x) integrates
to 0 against g1,w h i c hi saﬁxed probability density. If the support of g1 is unbounded, it








± ¤ vanishes, meaning that
('00
1 ¡ '0
1 (P000 ¡ '00
1))(P 00 ¡ '0
1)
¡2 vanishes on the range of ¤, which is precisely the domain




















51and P00 = a'0
1, ending with P 0 = a'1 +b. From Theorem 1, genreically this cannot happen





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Firms ¦(z)=º0 + º1z ¡ 1
2bz2 ¡ p(z)
º1,b¸ 0
lnº1 = º10 + º0
11x + "1
x and "1 are both distributed as a mixture of normals
(the mixtures could have only one component).
FOC º1 ¡ bz ¡ p0 (z)=0
SOC ¡b ¡ p00 (z) < 0
Workers V (z)=µ0 + µ1z ¡ 1
2az2 + p(z)
µ1,a¸ 0
lnµ1 = µ10 + µ
0
11y + "2
y and "2 are both distributed as mixtures of normals
Equilibrium
Figures (5) and (6) display the equilibrium slope and curvature of the
price function in the linear-quadratic hedonic model with the following re-
strictions º1 ¸ 0,µ 1 ¸ 0, and z ¸ 0.
The parameter values a =2 .0 and b =1 .0 were used. In addition, º1
and µ1 were assumed to be distributed as mixtures of two normals. The
parameters of the two normals are listed in the following table.
Components
1 2
µº 1.0 2.0
µµ -0.5 0.5
¾2
º 0.21 0.21
¾2
µ 0.61 0.61
¸º 0.5 0.5
¸µ 0.5 0.5-
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